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Summary
Corporate actors are amongst the most active and important players in the EU legal system, and 
have, since the EU’s birth, been instrumental in developing EU law by challenging EU and Member 
State measures which affect or devalue their economic interests. Indeed, by utilising the Treaty 
provisions pertaining to the “four freedoms”, corporate actors have strategically assisted the CJEU 
in breaking down internal barriers and impediments to the internal market. In addition to their 
interests captured by the “four freedoms”, corporate actors have frequently sought to avail 
themselves of a variety of other fundamental rights and freedoms, including: the right to property; 
the freedom of contract; the right to due process; and the freedom to conduct a business or engage 
in economic activity. Most of these rights are now enshrined in the EUCFR, which attained the 
status of primary law with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Due to the economic 
orientation of the EU and its policy and legislative goals, corporate actors are often the most likely 
to be affected by Union measures, and so it is important to consider the extent to which the CJEU, 
as the EU’s bastion of justice, protects the rights and freedoms of corporate actors. 
Despite having an array of “weapons” at its disposal to assist with this task, it is submitted that 
outside of the Treaty-based “four freedoms”, where corporate and EU interests generally align, the 
CJEU’s protection of corporate actors is inadequate. Indeed, by analysing two of the CJEU’s most 
promising and controversial “weapons”, the newly codified freedom to conduct a business or 
engage in economic activity (Article 16 EUCFR) and the Courts’ recently claimed “full 
jurisdiction” to review administrative decisions under Articles 261 and 263 TFEU, it appears that 
the CJEU’s approach is inconsistent, contradictory, and still offers no way to effectively challenge 
Union measures. In regards to the former, the CJEU either overlooks the freedom completely or 
easily finds that limitations to it are justified by countervailing rights or interests. Perhaps more 
detrimentally, it often fails to genuinely consider the right or engage in a comprehensive 
proportionality review. In regards to Articles 261 and 263, whilst the CJEU has used its jurisdiction 
to alter fines and quash decisions, deference to the Commission is still too strong to allow for full 
judicial review, and due process guarantees are questionable. Ultimately, the CJEU lacks 
ammunition, and its protection of corporate actors is undeniably hindered by its own self-imposed 
and overplayed deference to Union measures, which results in a trichotomous approach to the 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of corporate actors, and impedes effective 
judicial protection of their interests. 
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Abbreviations
CJEU  =  Court of Justice of the European Union
ECHR  =  The European Convention of Human Rights 
ECJ  =  European Court of Justice
ECSC   =  European Coal and Steel Community
ECtHR  =  The European Court of Human Rights
EU  =  European Union
EUCFR  =  European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
GC  =  General Court (formerly the ‘CFI’ = Court of First Instance)
TEU  =  Treaty on the European Union
TFEU  =  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
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1. Introduction
That companies or corporate actors derive enforceable rights from European Union law is not a 
particularly controversial or contested fact,1 nor is it unexpected when considering the origins of the 
European Union and its various legal and political objectives. Indeed, as countless academics and 
commentators have noted, the European Union’s origin was distinctly economic in nature, with 
Douglas-Scott describing economic rights as “the nucleus of any rights granted by the European 
Union”  and the “kernel of rights protection”  within the European Union legal order.2 As the main 
beneficiaries or standard-bearers of such an economically-focused legal order, it is unsurprising that 
corporate actors (whatever their legal form may be, though particularly large commercially-driven 
ones), “dominate” 3 the CJEU’s docket and have been instrumental in aiding European integration 
and the completion of the internal market, providing the politically-neutral Courts with the 
metaphorical sledgehammer needed to break down barriers that the politically-tied Commission 
could not.4 
Whilst the enjoyment of such rights is, as Emberland stresses,5 generally not disputed within the 
legal academic community, the exact nature, degree, and scope of the rights afforded to companies 
by the European legal order is a subject of much theoretical and practical debate. This debate has 
arguably proved most controversial in regards to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which unlike the EU, is not founded on any economic motivation, but rather the “universal 
observance and enforcement” of “Human Rights”  necessary for the attainment of “justice and peace 
in the world”.6 Nonetheless, the arguments advanced in this debate can also be applied to the EU, 
especially post-TEU, where the EU began to incorporate wider non-commercial “fundamental 
rights”  into its legal-web. With the Charter of Fundamental Rights joining the ranks of primary law 
of the European Union post-Lisbon Treaty, such debates are likely to intensify, with the central 
question being the extent to which companies can rely on rights aimed primarily at natural 
individuals, particularly to the effect that they are able to undermine the protection of such 
5
1 Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies (OUP 2006) 1.
2 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson Education 2002) 454-455.
3 Carol Harlow, ‘Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European Convention and European Union’ in Philip Alston, 
Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (eds) The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999) 195.
4 Note particularly in this regard how the Court secured its own supremacy in Costa (Case C-6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] 
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66), and how it constructed the controversial principle of “mutual recognition” in Cassis (Case 
C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:42) where the 
Commission was stifled by political considerations and discord.  See also Hofmann (n 65) 7.
5 Emberland (n 1) 1.
6 Preamble, the European Convention on Human Rights.
individuals or “avoid”  key aspects of European law.7  A full consideration of the extent to which 
companies can or should be able to rely on non-economic “human rights”  is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, as is an exploration of the semantic differences between “fundamental”  and “human” 
rights. It is sufficient here to note that unlike the ECHR, the European Union is not as affected by 
this existential issue of what human rights actually are, or the “conceptual oxymoron” 8 that 
companies are able to possess “human rights” which should be protected. 
Indeed, many argue that within the EU legal order, due to the strength of the economic rights found 
in the Treaties (particularly the “four freedoms” 9), and the general perception that the internal 
market “towers over all other objectives”,10 the fundamental economic freedoms have acquired a 
status akin to those of fundamental human rights typically protected by States. As such, some 
commentators have even resolved that within the EU, “human rights and market freedoms are, in 
effect, one and the same thing”.11 Certainly, Alston laments that human rights have for most of the 
EU’s existence been an “afterthought”,12 and that even when they were finally introduced they were 
merely “grafted onto a set of Treaties”.13 That the Charter of Fundamental Rights languished on the 
sidelines for so many years does little to contest this stance, but whether this economic or market 
bias still “towers”  over all other objectives is questionable, especially in recent years with more 
attention being paid to social and political rights, and the implementation of the EUCFR, which 
largely reflects the ECHR and maintains as such in Article 52(3). It is however, hard to dispute that 
market integration is still a key priority for the Union institutions,14 which inevitably means that the 
EU approach still largely “privileges”  economic freedoms over human rights15 and that litigation is 
still predominantly concerned with trade and commerce.16
6
7 See generally Emberland and his review of critics who argue companies should not be able to avail themselves of 
“human rights” due to the fear that they may manipulate them or use them to “advance policies to the detriment of the 
democratic process”. Emberland (n 1)  27-31.
8 Emberland (n 1) 25-27.
9 Free movement of goods, services, persons and capital respectively, found in Titles II and IV TFEU. 
10 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the 
European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307, 1308. 
11 See Alston’s consideration of Petersmann’s position: Philip Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human 
Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13 EJIL 815, 817-821. See also Douglas-Scott (n 2) 456. 
12 Alston (n 11) 821.
13 Alston (n 11) 821.
14 In this respect, see generally Article 3 TEU, which emphasises the central place of the internal market. 
15 Alston (n 11) 823.
16 Harlow (n 3) 195. 
A problem remains however where traditionally “human”  rights converge with “economic”  ones. 
As socially-constructed “legal persons”, many legal systems (including the EU) allow, in addition to 
more specific company or commercial law rights, companies to benefit from rights that are 
traditionally aimed at protecting individual persons.17 Naturally, companies or corporate actors will 
not be able to avail themselves of rights such as freedom against torture or inhuman treatment, or 
other more classically “human”  rights found in instruments such as the ECHR, but as Emberland 
rightly caveats, it “cannot be denied that civil and political rights can be capable of protecting 
different forms of economic activity”.18 Nor can it be denied that in a legal system which can 
appreciably affect the economic sphere within which they operate, corporate actors should be able 
to rely on such civil and political rights to protect their commercial interests, whether it be before 
national courts or through direct challenges to the Union institutions. Indeed, despite their 
commercial nature, corporate actors share many similar interests to natural persons, with property 
protection, non-discrimination, legal certainty, and due process perhaps being the most salient.19 It 
does not therefore seem unreasonable to extend these guarantees to legal as well as natural persons, 
as due to the potential size of the former, the stakes can often be much greater.
In addition to the aforementioned rights, and perhaps more peculiar to corporate actors, the 
“freedom to conduct a business”  or “economic activity”, now contained in Article 16 EUCFR, 
represents a more controversial and direct expression of a company’s interest. The controversiality 
of the “freedom”  arguably lies in its inherent ambiguity, as despite having existed under various 
guises throughout the lifespan of the EU, it has yet to receive an explicit definition, and Article 16 
marks the first time a legally binding Union document has recognised it as a “freedom”.20 As Usai 
notes, the EUCFR aims not to create new rights, but to give greater visibility to existing 
“fundamental rights”.21 That the freedom stands alone and distinct from related rights such as the 
right to property (Article 17) and the right to engage in work and choose an occupation (Article 15) 
may also prove significant, as historically the right to “economic initiative”  has often been 
entangled with other rights, such as the right to property.22 The scope and potential of Article 16 is 
thus a matter of much debate, and will be explored further below. What is clear is that the right does 
7
17 Emblerand (n 1) 1.
18 Emberland (n 1) 2.
19 Emberland (n 1) 1.
20 Andrea Usai, ‘The Freedom to Conduct a Business in the EU, Its Limitations and Its Role in the European Legal 
Order: A New Engine for Deeper and Stronger Economic, Social and Political Integration’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 1867, 1868. Note also that Article 16 actually sits within the “Freedoms” Chapter (II) of the EUCFR. 
21 Usai (n 20) 1868.
22 Usai (n 20) 1868.
not, and should not, afford companies with “unmitigated free reign” 23 or an unbridled freedom to 
pursue their own commercial interests. Indeed, Article 16 itself ensures this, limiting the freedom to 
what is “in accordance”  with national and community law. How the Courts interpret this last part 
will determine the utility of the freedom, but it will be submitted that the Courts should be more 
ready to recognise the freedom as a standalone right which should be considered when looking at 
claims brought against corporate actors. 
1.1 The Three Faces of the CJEU: A Trichotomous Approach to the Protection of Rights
It is clear from the preceding discussion that companies are able to invoke both the stronger 
economic fundamental rights found in the Treaties (such as the four freedoms), and many of the 
civil and political rights residing in the Charter and case law of the CJEU. Indeed, companies have 
for a long time been the “main litigants” 24 before the CJEU, and corporate claims make up a 
significant portion of all fundamental rights litigation before the Courts,25 with many of the EU’s 
seminal cases such as Van Gend & Loos,26  Costa, and Cassis di Dijon, being initiated by, or 
involving, companies. What is less clear however, is whether the CJEU sufficiently protects these 
rights and ensures their recognition, not just nationally but also at the EU level where the EU 
institutions are involved. von Bogdandy, writing in 2000, warned of a “double standard” 27 in the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence, with its level of review or scrutiny largely dependent on the defendants and 
parties involved. Building on this, it is submitted that, at present, one can actually identify a 
trichotomous approach from the Courts when it comes to the protection of company rights. 
First, where Treaty-based “fundamental rights”  are concerned, especially as against Member States 
or involving the internal market, it would appear the Courts are quite willing to uphold a company’s 
rights and enforce EU laws against the infringing State(s) in question. This is most obvious in 
regards to the “four freedoms”, where the ECJ28 has, on multiple occasions, rendered national law 
incompatible with EU law for not adequately respecting EU law. Perhaps the most cognizant 
example of this more boisterous approach can be seen in the Court’s much-debated “Dassonville 
8
23 See Emblerland in regards to the ECHR, Emberland (n 1) 25.
24 Douglas-Scott (n 2) 455.
25 Emberland (n 1) 1.  
26 Case C-26/62 Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
27 von Bogdandy (n 10) 1321.
28 Due to the more limited role of the GC in Article 267 references, which form the bulk of cases here, most of the cases 
regarding the four freedoms have been before the ECJ. As such reference to the CJEU collectively refers primarily to 
the ECJ in cases other than the competition law ones discussed in Section 3. 
formula”  where it controversially held that “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions” (emphasis added).29 
Whilst the court limited the extent of this far-reaching statement in later cases such as Keck,30  its 
intent is clear, that Member States must not adopt or maintain measures that limit the ability of 
“citizens”  (here largely corporate actors) to operate freely within the internal market. A similar 
approach, Barnard observes,31  can be found in regards to the other three fundamental freedoms, 
with the ECJ increasingly focused on measures which impede or restrict “access”  to the internal 
market rather than just those which are discriminatory. Indeed, this market access approach32 
reflects the “integrationist bias”33 of the EU, and undoubtedly contributes to why companies have 
been so successful in this particular area of EU law, as their interests and objectives are in line with 
those of the CJEU and the EU generally.34 
As many critics have already noted, there is “no doubt”  that the the four freedoms have been 
“highly developed” 35 by the Court, and that the Court has been  “very successful” 36  in eliminating 
internal barriers to market integration. This success may underpin assertions that the ECJ sees no 
real hierarchy between fundamental economic freedoms and human rights, and whilst some 
question whether the Court is doing enough in regards to the freedom of establishment,37  it would 
appear that this “right to economic activity”  and “market citizenship”  as attained through the four 
freedoms, remains the “most highly developed part of EU law”.38  Furthermore, attempts by 
Member States to deviate from these freedoms have not proved very successful, with the Courts 
adopting a strict proportionality review, particularly where the Member State in question raises an 
9
29 Case C-8/74 Procureur de Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:82 para 5. 
30 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-298/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:905. See also generally Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (4th ed, OUP 2013) 
Chapter 5.
31 Barnard (n 30) 102-108.  See also Säger (Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. [1991] ECLI:EU:C:
1991:331), where the court at para 12 said Art 56 TFEU required the elimination of: “not only... all discrimination on 
the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction... when it is 
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services...”. 
32 Also seen in more recent cases such as Trailers (Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:66) and 
Mickelsson (Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:336). 
33 Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘From the Margins: The Government Agents’ in Antoine Vauchez (ed) Lawyering Europe: 
European Law as a Transnational Social Field (Hart 2013) 59.
34 Harlow (n 3) 195.
35 Douglas-Scott (n 2) 456.
36 von Bogdandy (n 10) 1324.
37 See for example the Cartesio case (Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:723), 
and the Court’s reluctance to impose on matters of registration it believes reside with Member States. 
38 Douglas-Scott (n 2) 455.
economic defence. As such, companies looking to enforce Treaty provisions such as the free 
movement of goods against a Member State are in a good position to do so, and are more likely 
encounter a sympathetic Court. 
The situation is not so positive however, when one starts to move away from the typical 
economically-based fundamental freedoms found in the Treaties. Indeed, a second, more 
ambivalent approach from the Courts can be found when invoking less-established rights from the 
Charter, or where more sensitive or controversial countervailing rights are raised and the Courts are 
forced to engage in a balancing act. Certainly, cases like Groener,39  Grogan,40  and Omega41 
highlight this more cursory level of review where Member States raise defences which are more 
politically sensitive, with Grogan involving the promotion of abortion services which are illegal in 
Ireland, and Omega the offering of services which entailed “playing at killing”  and were thus 
deemed contrary to constitutional German laws on dignity. In these cases, the Court seemed 
reluctant to engage in a detailed proportionality analysis akin to that found in Schmidberger,42 
where the Court held fundamental rights could constitute a legitimate interest, and could, where 
proportionate, restrict economic freedoms.43 Instead, it preferred to either avoid the issue (Grogan) 
or more readily accept the arguments put forward (Groener and Omega). Whilst no judgement is 
submitted as to whether or not the Court came to the correct conclusion in these cases, its level of 
proportionality review is significant and marks a clear departure from its more aggressive 
integrationist approach found above, with Smith highlighting its particularly “weak”  proportionality 
review in Groener,44  and Shuibhne citing Omega as the clearest example of “deference”  to a 
Member State.45  It is notable though, that these cases, unlike Schmidberger, involved more 
culturally-specific matters, and were thus perhaps understandably treated more cautiously by the 
10
39 Case C-379/87 Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee [1989] 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:599.
40 Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:378.
41 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn. 
[2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:614.
42 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger and others v Republik Österreich [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:333.
43 Schmidberger (n 42) paras 74-81. See also generally, Truelove, and his criticism of the Court’s level of review in the 
Omega case: Nicholas Truelove, 'Deference From Fundamental Rights: A Case Commentary On The European Court 
Of Justice’s Decision Of Omega' (2012) 4 The Student Journal of Law <http://www.sjol.co.uk/issue-4/deference-from-
fundamental-rights-a-case-commentary-on-the-european-court-of-justice-s-decision-of-omega-spielhallen--und-
automatenaufstellungs-gmbh-v-oberburdermeisterin-der-bundesstadt-bonn> accessed 3 May 2015. It may also be worth 
noting the heightened potential granted by the ECUFR for this more direct application of rights, rather than the 
historical reliance on “public policy” or other ambiguously phrased exceptions found in the Treaties.
44 Rachel Craufurd Smith, ‘The Evolution of Cultural Policy in the European Union’ in Paul Craig and Grainne de 
Burca (eds) The Evolution of European Law (2nd ed, OUP 2011) 880. 
45 Nic Shuibhne, ‘Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law’ (2009) 
34 EL Review 230, 243.
Court which tends to give greater discretion in such cases, lest it be accused of cultural 
imperialism.46 
Where the rights in question are less culturally-sensitive, the approach of the CJEU becomes even 
more contradictory and inconsistent, a feature that is likely to be exacerbated by the enhanced legal 
status of the EUCFR and the increased potential for conflict.  Indeed, in some cases, such as 
Schmidberger, where the freedoms of expression and assembly47 were held to prevail over the free 
movement of goods,48  the Court can be seen engaging in a rather comprehensive balancing of 
rights, a task de Vries suggests it should be more ready to partake in.49 Likewise, in Viking50 and 
Laval,51  horizontal cases involving private parties and concerning the clash of fundamental 
freedoms and the right to collective action, the Court was more assertive in its reasoning, mirroring 
its integrationist approach outlined above. In Viking, it held that whilst collective action is a 
fundamental right of Union law, as now recognised by Article 28 EUCFR, the collective action 
envisaged would render “less attractive, or even pointless” 52 Viking’s exercise of its rights to 
freedom of establishment, and thus was not justified or proportionate. In Laval, the Court was 
similarly determined, rejecting Member State submissions that collective action fell outside of EU 
law, and holding again that it was unjustified due to its effect on Laval’s right to provide services. 
Unsurprisingly, both Viking and Laval53 were subject to much criticism, with some decrying the 
possibility that fundamental rights could be construed as restrictions on economic rights, or that 
employers now have a new “weapon with which to oppose industrial action.” 54 In this regard, it is 
worth re-iterating that unlike the ECHR, the EU legal system is not primarily concerned with civil 
and political rights,55 and fundamental economic freedoms are, in practice, awarded a status similar 
11
46 See also now Article 4(2) which provides that the Union shall “respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional...” and 
has been the subject of much academic discussion. 
47 Now contained in Articles 11 and 12 EUCFR. 
48 Wolf Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-003,  22.
49 Sybe A. de Vries, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms According to the European Court of 
Justice’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 169,  170.
50 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:772.
51 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
52 Viking (n 50) para 72.
53 See Rebecca Zahn, ‘The Viking and Laval Cases in the Context of European Enlargement’ [2008] 3 Web JCLI 
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issue3/zahn3.html>  accessed 28th April 2015, for further discussion on the two cases. 
54 Daniel Ornstein, ‘Laval, Viking Line and the Limited Right to Strike‘ ELA Briefing <http://www.elaweb.org.uk/
resources/ela-briefing/laval-viking-line-and-limited-right-strike> accessed 29th April 2015.
55 Contrast this with Emberland’s discussion of the ECHR, Emberland (n 1) 32-33.
to those of other fundamental rights.56 Thus, the possibility that these economic freedoms could 
outrank other fundamental rights should not be particularly surprising, especially if one accepts 
proportionality as a key tenet of EU law. What is important is that it remain a “possibility”, which 
means the CJEU must be more consistent and transparent in its balancing of rights, highlighting 
more clearly on a case-by-case basis why certain rights prevail over others, as it did to some extent 
in Schmidberger and Viking.57
Unfortunately, such consistency has yet to be achieved, especially when moving away from the four 
freedoms where the EU’s integrationist objective is no longer in accordance with the interests of the 
companies involved. Indeed, where companies invoke more individual rights such as the right to 
property (Article 17 EUCFR and Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR), due process (Article 47 EUCFR and 
Art 6 ECHR), or freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 EUCFR), the CJEU’s support wanes, 
particularly when they conflict with politically “hot”  countervailing rights such as the right to 
privacy (Article 7 EUCFR and Article 8 ECHR) or personal data (Articles 8 EUCFR and ECHR). 
Corporate applicants therefore face an unpredictable court, with its level of review being largely a 
matter of chance and circumstance. Whilst Scarlet Extended58 provides some hope for those looking 
to enforce such rights, with the Court demonstrating a more commercially aware approach, Sky 
Österreich59 shows the other end of the spectrum. The recent Google Spain60 case adds even more 
uncertainty, as the Court patently overlooked the commercial rights of Google, focusing instead 
almost exclusively on the right to privacy.  These cases will be considered more fully in Section 2, 
when analysing whether there actually is a freedom to conduct business, and whether the CJEU 
adequately protects or ensures it. As companies are among the most active litigants before the 
Courts, it seems inevitable that these Charter rights will only become more popular, with companies 
using them, perhaps collectively, to either defend their own actions or attack incompatible measures 
and actions. The Courts must therefore adopt a more coherent body of case law in order to provide 
some legal certainty for all involved.
Before considering the final approach, it should be pointed out that this ambivalence is not confined 
to corporate applicants, and natural or non-commercially motivated individuals/associations face 
12
56 Jason Coppel and Aidon O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 Common 
Market Law Review 669, 690.
57 Unfortunately it was not as explicit in Laval, and the culpability of the trade unions was entangled with Sweden’s 
failure to provide transparency over the legal situation. 
58 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:771.
59 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:28.
60 Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google Inc. v AEPD and Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
similar issues, as is clear from the fact they often represent the opposing side of the cases analysed 
throughout this thesis. Many commentators thus criticise the CJEU’s general approach to the 
protection of non-Treaty enshrined fundamental rights (whether economic or not), with it appearing 
“superficial” 61 at best and dismissive at worst. Indeed, Leczykiewicz notes the peculiarity that 
within the EU, fundamental rights have always been in a “much weaker position”  than similar 
constitutional rights found in Member States, especially when being used to challenge legislative 
acts.62 Whilst some hoped the incorporation of the EUCFR would lead to a “tightening”  of the 
protection of “individual freedoms”,63  it is not evident that this has occurred.  The focus of this 
thesis is nonetheless on the perspective of companies, as there is already much literature on the role 
of non-corporate individuals/associations in the EU legal order. 
The final approach of the European courts is the most unsympathetic to corporate applicants, and is 
most evident in cases where a Union institution’s action is being challenged. This is especially true 
where the Commission is involved, and in such cases, Vane posits that the “house always wins”,64 a 
sentiment shared by Hofmann, who notes the “startling empirical insight”  that “the European 
Commission always wins”.65 Due to the stringent admissibility requirements found in Article 263 
TFEU, many of the cases to which these academics refer are competition cases, as 
“addressees”  (corporate or natural) of a Union “act”  (here mostly Commission decisions) will have 
privileged standing before the Courts. Its approach here is almost the antithesis of the approach 
taken against Member States, and many academics have criticised this “fundamental bias in the 
ECJ’s administration of justice”, which entails a lenient attitude as against Union institutions and a 
draconian one as against Member States.66 Indeed, this approach has even led some to conclude that 
proportionality in the EU is a term “devoid of meaning”,67  as due to what AG Kokott68  has 
described as the “presumption of lawfulness of Community law”, the Courts apply different tests 
depending on whether a Union institution or Member State is being challenged. For the former, a 
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manifestly disproportionate test is applied, and for the latter a least restrictive means test.69 This 
division, along with the generally unwritten nature of the rights and freedoms pre-Lisbon Treaty, 
has ultimately allowed the CJEU to “independently”  define the level of protection rights are given, 
and to “differentiate the standard” required from Member States and Union institutions.70 
Whether or not such a division is justified, the ramifications for those looking to challenge Union 
acts are clear. In competition law cases, these ramifications are heightened due to the Commission’s 
central role as judge, jury, and executioner, with it conducting the investigation and issuing 
penalties under Article 23 Regulation 1/2003, which it can then enforce before the CJEU and 
increase in the event of non-compliance. This role has been criticised on due process grounds and 
will be further considered in Section 3, when looking at whether the CJEU71 is adequately 
protecting companies under Articles 263 and 261 when reviewing acts of the Commission. Despite 
claiming “full jurisprudence”, many have questioned the degree to which the Courts can actually 
review Commission decisions, and considering the extent to which the Commission can fine 
companies,72  this is a worrying question. With recent comments and actions from the EU’s new 
Competition Commissioner Vestager suggesting the start of a potentially “more activist period” 73 in 
EU competition enforcement, the CJEU’s role may yet become more prominent, in a departure from 
the Almunia era where around 90% of non-cartel cases were resolved through commitment 
decisions.74 The rights of companies in such cases is thus a critical topic, and the CJEU must ensure 
it meets its own obligations under the EUCFR (see Article 51) as an EU institution itself. 
1.2  Weapons at the CJEU’s Disposal
As explored above, corporate actors have many interests which they may seek to protect through 
the EU Courts, and the extent to which these interests can be protected by EU law is dependent on 
how the CJEU interprets the various provisions aiming to safeguard these interests. Certainly, there 
are many tools or “weapons”  at the CJEU’s disposal in this regard, and as has been outlined above, 
it is more than capable of using them where it so desires or where it is inspired by EU policy 
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objectives such as the integration factor. Whilst not weapons the Courts themselves can wield, the 
Treaty provisions pertaining to judicial review (primarily Articles 263 and 267 TFEU) are effective 
tools for opening the arena for the Courts to invoke their expansive jurisdiction, and as has been 
mentioned, it has not been shy in using the Treaty provisions relating to the four freedoms to strike 
down incompatible measures and build up an admirable body of case law. The EUCFR and its vast 
array of freedoms and rights, the ECHR, and the general principles of EU law are further weapons 
that the CJEU can use to assist it in the protection of fundamental rights (economic or otherwise). It 
would appear however that these tools have been grossly underused by the Court, and it is not clear 
that the EUCFR’s coming of age has done much to alter this, despite it having “the same legal value 
as the Treaties”.75 There is however much potential, should the Courts choose to embrace the 
EUCFR as primary legislation, and it would still seem to be the case that there is “little reason not 
to develop pertinent primary law” 76 on fundamental rights, especially now that they can refer to the 
rights more explicitly rather than relying on strained or ambiguous general principles. 
Naturally, it is not possible to consider every weapon or tool at the CJEU’s disposal and whether its 
trichotomous approach is consistent with them, nor is it feasible to investigate every option open to 
companies which wish to challenge aspects of EU law that impede or otherwise negatively affect 
their ability to conduct a business or pursue commercial interests. Thus, the focus of this analysis 
will be on what are arguably the most controversial and underutilised weapons in the CJEU’s 
toolbox: the Article 16 EUCFR freedom to conduct a business (and where appropriate the various 
associated rights), and the CJEU’s ability under Articles 261 and 263 TFEU to “review the 
legality... of acts... of the Commission”  brought by “any natural or legal person”  sufficiently 
concerned, on the grounds of “lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or 
misuse of powers”. EU competition law will form the conduit through which Articles 261 and 263 
are analysed, and this thesis will not consider the agricultural sector or EU laws pertaining to that 
which have also been the subject of many proceedings brought by companies against the 
Commission. 
The potential interplay between these weapons will also be discussed, with it being submitted that 
the CJEU should be prepared to use the EUCFR to engage in a more thorough analysis of Union 
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legislation and Commission decisions, particularly where the Decision in question suggests or 
requires remedies which encroach upon a company’s freedom to conduct a business. 
1.3 Ammunition
Through analysing the above “weapons”  at the CJEU’s disposal it will be argued that, at present, 
and outside of the sphere of the four freedoms, the CJEU is not sufficiently protecting the 
fundamental rights of corporate actors within the EU, and thus is not sufficiently meeting its own 
obligations to recognise the rights and freedoms enshrined in the EUCFR. Whilst it has a variety of 
weapons to help it achieve this, the CJEU lacks ammunition and has been reluctant to use the tools, 
as evidenced by its inconsistent three-fold approach to the protection of rights and the unfortunate 
“proliferation of different proportionality tests”.77 Such a situation undermines key principles of EU 
law such as proportionality, equality, and legal certainty, and when coupled with the due process 
criticisms levied against its lenient treatment of EU institutions, may eventually erode its 
legitimacy, and encourage rich and influential corporate actors to try and achieve their interests 
through less transparent means such as lobbying,78 which could further threaten the rule of law. 
There is however, scope for the CJEU to increase its protection of such fundamental rights, and 
whilst, as von Bogdandy notes,79  there is no general right “against any form of intrusion”, it is 
essential for the CJEU to strike the right balance between competing interests, and be more 
consistent and explicit about why its outcomes are “right”  or justified in each specific case where it 
engages in such a balancing act.
2. Is There Freedom to Conduct a Business?
2.1 Article 16: The Freedom
Article 16 EUCFR states that:
“The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and 
practices is recognised”. 
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The wording of Article 16 is not likely to convince many that the EU has fully embraced a general 
right to conduct business, or what Petersmann has previously referred to as a “fundamental human 
right to trade”,80  but its very inclusion in the EUCFR is a progressive step on the part of the EU. 
Indeed, its inclusion in the EUCFR’s “freedoms”  chapter on its own merits,81  unattached or 
subsumed by more nebulous rights and principles such as the right to property or legitimate 
expectations, marks the first time such a freedom has been recognised in a transnational agreement 
focused on the protection of “fundamental rights”. A similar freedom can however be found in the 
constitutions of some Member States, including Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Finland.82 At this 
point, it is important to recall that the EUCFR aims only to give greater “visibility”  to existing 
rights, and does not purport to create any new rights or alter the existing competences of the EU, as 
is clear from Article 51(2) EUCFR and Article 6(1) TEU. As such, it would be incorrect to state that 
Article 16 gives “new” rights to companies to push their commercial interests. The novelty 
however, is its disentangling from other rights, which, much like the EUCFR intended to do, gives 
it greater visibility and thus potential to be used in its own right, rather than as a parasitic right 
apathetically tagged onto more established rights in an attempt to strengthen one’s case. 
The problem however, is identifying what exactly the freedom aims to protect, as the CJEU, despite 
the freedom’s “long history in EU law”,83  has been rather unobliging in this respect, and the case 
law thus far (where acknowledging it at all) tends to simply cite Article 16 without appraising what 
it actually entails.84 The somewhat ambiguous limitation found in Article 16 also leaves much room 
for clarification, as it is not particularly evident what conduct will be deemed “in accordance” with 
Union and national law. Indeed, if taken too literally, any provision or practice found in Union or 
national law, or any act made by a Member State or Union institution affecting the freedom to 
conduct business, would arguably supersede Article 16 which would then again be subject to the 
new law, however intrusive. Such circularity would render Article 16 wholly redundant, as it would, 
in effect, be almost impossible to invoke or consider, except in the unlikely case that the law or 
practice itself was unlawful to begin with.85 It seems highly unlikely such a result was intended, as 
it would alter the nature of the “pre-existing”  freedom, contrary to the EUCFR’s mandate, and be 
inconsistent with the EU’s economically-conscious agenda and the “almost universally 
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acknowledged requirement”  that individuals be able to conduct business or partake in economic 
activity without “unnecessary state intervention”.86 
At the same time, it seems clear the freedom is not intended to protect the “subjective positions of 
individuals” 87 or allow for the unrestrained pursuit of commerce. If one considers the history of the 
freedom, as Oliver has,88  and the EUCFR’s legal explanation, the freedom appears to be an 
“amalgam” 89 of three rights, those being: the freedom to exercise economic initiative and economic 
activity; the freedom of contract; and the right to free competition. It is submitted that the first of 
these is most representative of the telos and current formulation of Article 16, as alluded to by AG 
Cruz-Villalón in Mark Alemo-Herron.90  The second and third however, provide useful context with 
which to interpret the freedom, and imply a slightly broader reading than Article 16 would suggest. 
As such, Usai’s submission that Article 16 “protects all economic and social benefits deriving from 
the free market”,91  whilst perhaps a little optimistic, may not be so at odds with the nature of the 
freedom, despite the lacklustre wording of Article 16 itself. Indeed, AG Cruz-Villalón recognises 
that the freedom, which is also a general principle of EU law, “acts to protect economic initiative 
and economic activity”  and, within limits, ensure “certain minimum conditions for economic 
activity in the internal market”.92 Such an interpretation is probably the most explicit quasi-judicial 
consideration of Article 16, and mirrors the general idea outlined above, that individuals should be 
free to engage in economic activity without unnecessary state, or indeed, EU, intervention. The case 
law however, would suggest it may also have a significant role to play in private horizontal disputes 
such as Viking or Laval outlined above, or in Mark Alemo-Herron itself, where certain “dynamic 
clauses”  relating to collective agreements were pitted against secondary legislation and fundamental 
rights, and held to be contrary to EU law (discussed below). 
The need to protect and promote economic initiative and activity is generally consistent with the 
integrationist ideology underpinning the four freedoms, which aim primarily to help with the 
attainment of the free market by abolishing unnecessary internal restrictions to trade. Indeed, it 
would be futile to remove barriers and ensure access to the market, if, once there, one were unable 
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to exercise any autonomy or recoup any benefits derived from such initiative or activity.93 Whilst, as 
Groussot et al. highlight,94  AG Cruz-Villalón stresses the freedom to conduct a business protects 
participation in the market, rather than financial profit, there exists a wide gulf between “access” 
and “participation”, with access being no indication of an ability to participate. Ensuring access to 
the market is not therefore enough to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of corporate 
actors, and though the CJEU has successfully used the four freedoms to protect various forms of 
economic initiative, the provisions are not wide enough to catch every situation where economic 
activity might be unduly repressed by others, whether they be Member States, Union institutions, or 
other individuals. 
Cases such as Mark Alemo-Herron, Scarlet Extended, and Sky Österreich, demonstrate this lacuna, 
and the other associated rights such as the right to property, freedom to choose an occupation, 
freedom to contract, and right to free competition, are equally ill-equipped to adequately protect 
corporate actors against undue interference. Indeed, the right to property has been interpreted in line 
with Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, which allows for “broad justifications for interference” 95, and 
protects only the right to “retain”  or “transfer”  property, not to acquire it.96 Likewise, the freedom to 
contract is unsurprisingly limited to more contractual issues like the one found in Mark Alemo-
Herron, and the right to free competition consists primarily of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, both of 
which are heavily restricted, requiring either illegal and non-insignificant agreements affecting 
trade, or a finding of dominance and subsequent abuse, requirements not easily met and ultimately 
for use by the Commission, not individuals.97 
Article 16 therefore has an important place within the EU legal order, and can, if used to its full 
potential, ensure more effective protection of corporate actors. Usai even submits that it could be 
used as a “new engine of European social, economic, and political integration”,98 and thus benefit 
consumers and the internal market by counteracting protectionism, reverse discrimination and even 
the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives, issues which have plagued the EU since its genesis. 
It seems unlikely, due to the CJEU’s hesitance, that Article 16 will have such a revolutionary 
impact, but as he rightly notes, in times of economic uncertainty, protectionism can be a “silver 
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bullet”  for overcoming issues such as unemployment, inflation, and recession.99  What is often 
overlooked in such discussions, is the potential effect of protectionism stemming not just from 
Member States, but also competitors and, more controversially, EU institutions. Indeed, recent 
criticism of EU competition law has centred on this last point, with some arguing the EU is 
engaging in protectionist or “anti-American”  measures, with Google becoming a “lightning rod”  for 
European fears over Silicon Valley.100  The potential for Article 16 to combat possible EU 
protectionism will be considered further in Section 4. 
It is not proposed that the Courts prioritise the freedom to conduct a business or hold it sacrosanct; 
certainly, the CJEU’s long-standing position that “fundamental rights recognised by the Court are 
not absolute”  and “must be considered in relation to their social function”,101  as confirmed by 
Article 52 EUCFR, applies to Article 16 as well as every other fundamental right and freedom 
found in the EUCFR and EU Treaties. What is essential however, is that the CJEU treat this 
freedom in a manner consistent with how it treats other fundamental rights. Thus, it must genuinely 
recognise that this ability to engage in economic activity without undue interference is a legitimate 
principle of EU law,102 which is capable of being used as a “counterweight” 103 to other conflicting 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Where commercial or economic initiatives, activities, or interests 
are being jeopardised, the CJEU must therefore consider the proportionality of the interference in 
light of Article 16, and not be afraid to give priority to the freedom where it is proportionate to do 
so. As previously stressed, in this regard the CJEU is not in an analogous position to that of the 
ECtHR, which, perhaps rightly, appears more reluctant to allow corporate actors to benefit from the 
ECHR.104
The preceding is a normative discussion about the nature of Article 16, and how it should be utilised 
or interpreted by the EU Courts. Having outlined what the freedom entails, and its suggested 
embodiment of the “almost universally accepted requirement”  that individuals be able to engage in 
economic activity without undue interference, the case law of the CJEU will be considered to see 
the extent to which it is reflecting this approach, and ultimately, whether it is protecting this 
freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic activity. 
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2.2 The Court’s Approach to the Freedom to Conduct a Business
Whilst Article 16 marks the first time the freedom has been codified in EU law, it has been raised in 
its general principle form in a variety of cases over the years, beginning in 1974 with Nold,105 which 
concerned the ECSC Treaty and an alleged violation by the Commission of the applicant’s right to 
private property and economic initiative by its approval of new rules which required large 
wholesale orders and adversely affected medium-sized wholesalers. The Court did not explicitly 
address the claim in light of what is now Article 16, but did, as Oliver notes,106 recognise the non-
absolute existence of the “right”  or principle. Despite the various incarnations of this freedom,107 
the Courts have reaffirmed its existence in many subsequent cases, adding that limitations to the 
right or freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic activity are only justified if in 
accordance with the public interest and not constituting a disproportionate or intolerable 
interference.108 
Unfortunately, the Courts chose not to elaborate on what a disproportionate or intolerable 
interference would be, and this negligent approach109 to the freedom is representative of the general 
case law of the CJEU, with the Courts often citing or acknowledging its validity without actually 
considering the relevance of the freedom or its effect on the matter at hand, preferring instead to 
conclude on other grounds, such as the right to property.110 It is also significant that in nearly all of 
the cases where the Courts acknowledged the freedom, attempts to actually invoke it failed, 
possibly due to the ongoing problem that the Courts tend to combine or associate it with other 
rights, most notably the right to property, a right which Groussot et al. note is not normally upheld 
by the Courts.111
There are however, cases where the Courts seem to take a more conscientious approach to the 
economic interests of companies, even if not referring explicitly to the freedom outlined above. 
Indeed, Oliver cites Neu112 as an early case where the freedom to engage in economic activity or to 
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“choose whom to do business with”  was considered by the Court, and, whilst not invalidating the 
legislation being challenged, significantly influenced the Court’s interpretation of it, resulting in a 
more business friendly outcome which ensured producers wishing to switch to different dairy 
products were not prevented from doing so because of the milk quota regime in place. Such cases 
do not however, provide a particularly accurate indication of the CJEU’s approach to the actual 
freedom, and so more recent cases must be considered. 
With the ECJ only really acknowledging the Charter in 2006, a few years before it became binding 
with the Lisbon Treaty, it is not particularly surprising that reference to the freedom has been 
sparse, even if it was encapsulated in Article 16 in 2000. The 2005 Grand Chamber ABNA113 
decision though, largely reflects the interpretation of Article 16 given above, with the ECJ holding 
that a provision requiring manufacturers to give detailed ingredients lists to customers was not 
proportionate due to the potential for others to use the information to produce their own versions of 
the product. As the provision could not be justified on public health or any other grounds, the Court 
held that it was invalid. It is unfortunate that the Court chose not to explicitly use Article 16 to aid 
this outcome, relying instead on the principle of proportionality. Nonetheless, as Oliver114 
convincingly asserts, the decision was “tantamount”  to a finding that the provision breached the 
freedom to conduct a business. Indeed, the economic activity in question, here the sale of 
“feedingstuffs”, was unreasonably jeopardised or restrained by the requirements of the provision in 
question, and therefore held to be invalid. Even though the Court did not hold that Article 16 was 
infringed (a judgment made largely redundant by the finding that it was disproportionate and the 
fact that no fundamental rights were raised which Article 16 could counter), its approach is 
consistent with the need to ensure that individuals can engage in economic initiative or activity 
without intolerable interference, and thus suggests some protection of this freedom. Had there been 
a more tenable justification for the provisions, the Court may have considered competing freedoms 
such as the one under discussion.  
In more recent years, it would appear that the CJEU (and certainly the Advocate Generals)115 has 
been more willing to refer to the EUCFR, and though most of its references to Article 16 have been 
as superficial as its pre-Lisbon approach, there have been a handful of recent cases where the CJEU 
has finally addressed Article 16 more directly, albeit in combination with Union legislation and 
other rights. The two most important cases, Scarlet Extended and Sky Österreich, however, paint a 
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rather confused picture of the freedom, and when considered with the Google case below, do little 
to assuage legal certainty concerns.
The first of these cases, Scarlet Extended, is perhaps the most dramatic, with the Court essentially 
ruling that the proposed injunction infringed Scarlet Extended’s right to conduct business under 
Article 16. The case concerned a dispute between Scarlet Extended, an ISP operating in Belgium, 
and SABAM, an association representing the rights of authors, composers, and musical editors. The 
latter claimed that Scarlet Extended had infringed its members’ IP rights by allowing its users to 
illegally download and/or share their works. SABAM therefore sought an injunction in accordance 
with national law forcing Scarlet Extended, as an intermediary, to bring an end to the infringements 
by implementing, amongst other things, a complicated filtering system by which it could monitor its 
users and block the illegal sharing of files. After consulting experts to see if the proposed measures 
were even possible,116 the Brussels Court ordered that Scarlet Extended adopt them in order to bring 
an end to the infringements. Scarlet Extended then appealed arguing the requirements of the 
injunction were unfeasible, costly, impractical, and “doomed to fail”.117 They also argued that it was 
not compatible with the EUCFR,  Directive 2000/31 which prohibits obligations to monitor 
communications, and other EU Directives similarly limiting the ability of providers to disseminate, 
store, or manipulate the information they transmit or receive.  The appellate Court then sent a 
reference to the ECJ, which held that the injunction was not proportionate and not consistent with 
EU law, as it required indiscriminate monitoring of all users for an unlimited period of time and at 
the ISP’s sole expense. 
More importantly for this discussion, it recognised the clash of the fundamental right to property 
(here the intellectual property of SABAM’s members), and Scarlet Extended’s freedom to conduct a 
business. Indeed, it stated that whilst the right to property in Article 17 EUCFR must be observed, 
there is “nothing whatsoever suggesting the provision is inviolable or absolute”.118 As such, it is 
necessary to strike a fair balance between the two fundamental rights, and in this case, the proposed 
injunction would be a “serious infringement”119 of Scarlet Extended’s right to conduct business. 
Perhaps to mitigate the impact of the decision, which marked a departure from the cases above and 
Promusicae,120 it added that the ISP’s customers would also be affected as the measures, if imposed, 
would violate their rights to personal data (Article 8 EUCFR) and to receive or impart information 
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(Article 11 EUCFR).121 Nonetheless, as Oliver rightly notes,122 these latter rights very much played 
a supporting role, with Article 16 taking centre stage along with the secondary legislation.
Such a case indicates that the Court is prepared to use Article 16 as a “weapon”  with which to 
protect the rights of corporate actors and ensure that they can engage in economic activity without 
undue interference. It is also encouraging that the Court undertook a more detailed proportionality 
analysis, genuinely balancing the competing rights by considering their implications. The case is 
however, somewhat of an anomaly, and when considering the approach taken in Sky Österreich 
below, may be a product of its facts. Indeed, rather than combining Articles 16 and 17, as has been 
typical of the CJEU’s approach, it had to consider Article 16 in its own right due to the fact it 
actually clashed with the right to property. Whilst this is positive, it also reinforces the perception 
that the right to property is not highly regarded by the Courts, and thus where the two rights 
converge, it is likely that this unsympathetic approach to the latter will overshadow any genuine 
consideration of Article 16, thus limiting its ability to protect the freedom to engage in economic 
initiative or activity. The case also concerns a controversial global issue: the role of intermediaries 
in the infringement of IP rights by its users. Thus far, different approaches have been taken, and 
there is no general consensus on how culpable intermediaries should be or how invasive they should 
be in order to prevent such infringements.123 
Whilst Scarlet Extended demonstrated that the CJEU is able to use Article 16 in order to protect the 
rights of corporate actors, Sky Österreich reinforces the CJEU’s more cautious and diffident attitude 
to the freedom. The Grand Chamber case concerned the validity of Article 15(6) of Directive 
2010/13 relating to media services and requiring broadcasters who held exclusive broadcasting 
rights to allow competitors to use excerpts or snippets of “events of high interest to the public”. 
Where the implementing Member State allowed for compensation, it had to be restricted to the 
actual costs of providing access. Here Sky Österreich objected to another broadcaster using its 
football match snippets, contrary to the aforementioned Directive. The Austrian Court then 
submitted a reference to the ECJ asking whether the provision was compatible with the right to 
property and freedom to exercise economic activity. Once again the Court stressed that the freedom 
enshrined in Article 16 is “not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to its social function”.124 
After noting that the provision had a legitimate aim, that being the protection of media pluralism 
and the freedom to receive information (Article 11),125  the Court held that the provision was 
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suitable for achieving said aim, and that whilst it did interfere with Sky Österreich’s freedoms to 
contract and to conduct a business, it was justified and proportionate in this situation, largely due to 
the fact the provisions were limited to news programmes, had a maximum time limit, and required 
broadcasters to credit the original source. As such, the restriction to Article 16 was in accordance 
with Article 52(1) EUCFR. 
The outcome itself is predictable, but the Court’s treatment of Article 16 is highly significant. 
Indeed in paragraph 47, the Court explicitly highlighted that the wording of Article 16 “differs from 
the wording of the other fundamental freedoms”  found in Chapter II (Freedoms) and is similar to 
the generally weaker social rights contained in Chapter IV (Solidarity). As such, “the freedom to 
conduct business may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public authorities 
which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public interest”  (emphasis added). The 
affiliation with Chapter IV is consistent with Article 16’s development, as it was intended to act as a 
counterpoise to the rights contained in Chapter IV, but the reading of “in accordance with Union 
law and national laws and practices”  as allowing for “a broad range of interventions”  is 
disappointing, and appears to relegate Article 16 to a lower status of regard, reinforcing Lord 
Goldsmith’s126 view that the EUCFR is hierarchical with some rights and freedoms being stronger 
than others, a reality further confirmed in the AMS case.127  
What is encouraging though, is that once again the Court undertook a more detailed proportionality 
review, perhaps suggesting what Pirker128 refers to as “methodological refinement”  on the part of 
the Court when considering fundamental rights, a refinement necessary to ensure this freedom to 
exercise economic activity is protected. Indeed, as stressed previously, it is not submitted that 
Article 16 be inviolable, merely that it is explicitly considered and balanced with competing rights. 
The Court’s finding then that the provision was necessary and proportionate as it did not “affect the 
core content of the freedom”  or prevent the economic activity, is to be welcomed for its 
transparency. Unfortunately, subsequent cases such as McDonagh129 and Google Spain indicate this 
refinement is still an ongoing process, with the Court “scarcely attempting a serious balancing 
exercise” 130 in the former, and generally ignoring the freedom to conduct a business in the latter. 
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Interestingly, AG Cruz Villalón’s previously endorsed view of Article 16 in the Mark Alemo-Herron 
case came one month after the judgment above, and perhaps reaffirms that Sky Österreich need not 
be a death knell to Article 16’s application. Indeed, the case itself, similarly to Scarlet Extended, 
demonstrates the Court’s ability to use Article 16 to aid with the protection of the freedom to 
conduct a business, with it stating that it is “settled case-law”  that the provisions in question “must 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the fundamental rights as set out by the EUCFR”  and 
“must in any event comply with Article 16”  which covers, “inter alia, the freedom of contract”.131 It 
then used Article 16 to interpret the legislation in question,132  which protects employees by 
requiring transferees of undertakings to observe the terms and conditions of any collective 
agreement entered into by the transferor until they expire, are terminated, or novated. The dynamic 
clauses being challenged meant that terms in the collective agreement could be changed or altered 
post-transfer by a third party, here the National Joint Council which oversaw the collective 
agreement. As the transferee was not a member of the NJC, and could not be represented on it, it 
was unable to influence or negotiate any such alterations. Accordingly, the ECJ held that a Member 
State could not insist on the transfer of such clauses,133 as the legislation aimed to balance the rights 
of both employees and employers. As the employer/transferee had no ability to participate or assert 
its interests, its contractual freedom was “seriously reduced to the point”  where the limitation was 
“liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business”.134 This finding 
was contrary to the AG’s, who suggested the clauses could be in accordance with Article 16, so long 
as they are not unconditional and irreversible, as adjudged by the national court. Nonetheless, the 
Court’s explicit reference to, and consideration of, Article 16 is encouraging, and again shows that 
the Court is able to use the freedom to ensure companies can sufficiently engage in economic 
activity. 
The cases also indicate however, that the previously defined trichotomous approach of the CJEU is 
still very much alive, and it is significant that in Scarlet Extended and Mark Alemo-Herron, the 
measures being challenged were national in origin, which perhaps explains why the CJEU was 
more ready to directly grapple with Article 16 and uphold the interests of the companies. Indeed, as 
previously noted, the CJEU is traditionally more combative when considering national barriers to 
market access or trade, a hangover from the EU’s initial (and seemingly ongoing) economic 
disposition. ABNA can be similarly explained, and these cases support Usai’s135 assertion that the 
four freedoms and Article 16 actually aim to protect the same interests by removing barriers to 
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economic activity in the internal market. On the other hand, Sky Österreich represents a challenge 
to Union legislation, where the CJEU’s third stricter approach to the protection of rights is 
activated. This stricter approach is also evident in McDonagh, where the Court considered whether 
Regulation 261/2004, which requires air carriers to pay for their passengers’ accommodation and 
transport expenses in the event that they are unable to fly them home, was contrary to Ryan Air’s 
rights under Articles 16 and 17. Without conducting any real proportionality assessment, the Court 
held that the Regulation was proportionate and supported by Article 38 EUCFR, which seeks to 
protect customers. 
This contradictory approach means that the rights of corporate actors and the CJEU’s willingness to 
use Article 16 as a weapon will largely depend on which measures are being challenged, a state of 
affairs that will limit Article 16’s utility to the challenging of national or private measures,136 a task 
already largely catered for by the associated rights and the four freedoms, which Oliver contends,137 
despite requiring an interstate element, have been quite flexible in their scope and have at times 
emulated a “general freedom to trade”. Whilst this would still offer some indirect protection of the 
freedom, as mentioned, these associated rights and freedoms will not be able to cover all situations 
where the right to economic activity is interfered with, and will certainly be of little assistance when 
challenging Union legislation (considered further below). Thus, even if the CJEU were to engage in 
a full proportionality review in every case where fundamental rights conflicted, as it has been 
submitted it must, the weight given to each freedom will be influenced by the CJEU’s own self-
imposed “internal constraints”,138  with it seeming likely that where Union legislation is under 
consideration, rights opposing the freedom to conduct a business will be treated with higher esteem, 
as in Sky Österreich and McDonagh. Such self-imposed constraints ultimately, as Leczykiewicz 
notes, “devalues”  the protection of fundamental rights by the CJEU, and “enables timid reasoning” 
by the Courts which subsequently robs the EU of full justifications about why EU law is correct or 
“just”.139  
2.3 Google: Does the Right to be Forgotten Limit the Freedom to Conduct a Business?
Despite the continued low success rate of Article 16, the above cases show a greater tendency to 
refer to Article 16 and a possible “refinement”  on behalf of the CJEU to the consideration of 
fundamental rights. The recent Google Spain “right to be forgotten”  case however, represents a 
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more primitive and textual approach to fundamental rights, with the ECJ focusing primarily on the 
legislation in question, the anachronistic EU Data Protection Directive.140  In brief, the case 
concerned a Spanish citizen who wanted Google to remove access to an old news article 
documenting his troubled financial history. After controversially determining that Google was a 
“controller”  of data, contrary to the AG’s opinion and despite the fact the data had already been 
published elsewhere, the Court held that the Directive necessarily had broad territorial scope and 
consequently caught Google’s spanish subsidiary, even though its server operations were carried out 
in the USA. More controversially, it then held that Google, and seemingly search engine operators 
in general, was responsible for removing information, even where the information had been 
published legally elsewhere. Therefore, individuals have the right, under the Data Protection 
Directive, to request the removal of information that is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or 
excessive”  for the purposes of data processing.141 Without expressly stating so, the ECJ ultimately 
endorsed the “right to be forgotten”,142  and thus Google must, at its own expense and with no 
guidance or supervision, consider individual requests to remove search results, and itself determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether the data is such that it should be removed.143
Many expected the Court to follow the AG’s more subdued Opinion, and whilst the establishment 
of such a right is in line with current proposals for the controversial and drawn-out General Data 
Protection Regulation (indeed the initial Article 17 referred to the “right to be forgotten and to 
erasure”), the actual case creates much uncertainty for search engine operators, and potentially other 
social networks such as Facebook and Wikipedia. More importantly for this discussion, and in a 
departure from the other recent cases above, the ECJ entirely ignored the right to conduct a 
business, and undeniably failed to balance the competing interests of data subjects, Google, and 
other internet users (the general public). Indeed, instead of conducting a thorough proportionality 
analysis, the Court “easily” 144 found that Google’s economic interests were “overridden”,145  and 
that the potential seriousness of the interference with the right to privacy, as protected by the 
Directive, could not “be justified by merely the economic interest”  of the search engine operator.146 
It therefore appears that Peers is correct to assert that the CJEU concerned itself so much with the 
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right to privacy that it neglected to consider other applicable rights, such as Article 16.147 It did 
however, refer to the freedom of expression, albeit not expressly or intelligibly, suggesting there 
may be cases (such as those involving public figures) where the freedom of expression could 
outweigh the right to privacy. As regards the economic interests of corporate actors or their freedom 
to engage in economic activity, the Court seems to adopt an “automatic test” 148 subjugating the 
freedom to the right to privacy, contrary to its previous condemnation of such automaticity by 
Member States in ASNEF.149 It also largely ignored the interests of other internet users. 
The implications of such a statement are severe, and seem to suggest the right to privacy will 
always prevail over the economic interests of a corporate actor. Whilst the right to privacy has, 
perhaps rightly, always been a heavily protected fundamental right, such automaticity seems at odds 
with the nature of the EUCFR, and potentially subjects search engine operators (and other social 
networks) to much unnecessary litigation, especially if, as is the case here, they are left to determine 
for themselves without guidance which data should be removed. Indeed, it is not clear what a 
“public figure”  is, what information is unnecessary, inaccurate, inadequate or irrelevant, or which 
requests should be denied in “the interests of the general public”.150 Such uncertainty means there is 
much scope for error on the part of the search engine operator or “controller”  (likely to be 
interpreted broadly), a problem which is exacerbated by proposals to allow data protection 
authorities to impose fines of up to 2% of annual turnover on companies not respecting citizen 
rights under the General Data Protection Regulation.151 Protecting this right to be forgotten is also 
likely to be costly, as it would require active monitoring of removal requests, which could deter 
nascent economic actors from participating in the affected markets. 
Unfortunately, and despite the case being a prime candidate for further consideration of the 
freedom, the Court chose not to examine Article 16, and so it is unclear to what extent these easily 
overridden economic interests align with the freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic 
activity. That the Court’s reasoning pursues a similar agenda to the Commission is also significant, 
and again reflects this strict and inadequate approach to the protection of rights when challenging 
Union legislation. It remains to be seen how this decision will be construed in a wider context, but it 
seems likely, considering the European Parliament’s watering down of the right to just a “right to 
29
147 Peers, ‘Further Comments...’ (n 142). 
148 Peers, ‘Further Comments...’ (n 142).
149 Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 ASNEF and FECEMD v Administracion del Estado [2011] ECLI:EU:C:
2011:777. Indeed, here the Court held that the Spanish Court had failed to adequately balance the rights of data subjects 
and marketing companies, by ignoring the latter’s right to engage in business. 
150 European Commission Factsheet on the Right to be Forgotten (n 143), p5.
151 European Commission Factsheet on the Right to be Forgotten (n 143), p4. 
erasure”,152  that the right will be slightly more limited than Google Spain would suggest. In any 
event, it seems inevitable that the Court’s decision will be challenged in the near future, especially 
as the internet becomes more advanced and creates further platforms for the infringement of 
fundamental rights such as the right to privacy. For now though, the case represents a clear failure 
by the Court to consider the rights of corporate actors. 
2.4 Article 16 as a Sword? 
It has already been noted that, in addition to being invoked as a defence, Article 16 can, in theory, 
be used to challenge national and Union (secondary) legislation, whether directly (through Article 
263 TFEU) or indirectly (through Article 267 TFEU), as demonstrated by cases such as Mark 
Alemo-Herron and Sky Österreich. Whilst many have recognised the huge potential for Article 16 in 
this regard,153 it is also clear that the CJEU’s prejudice will play a role in the success of such claims, 
with attacks against national measures (if within the scope of the EUCFR154) seeming more likely to 
succeed (as was the case in Scarlet Extended and Mark Alemo-Herron) than those against Union 
acts. This means that Article 16 is unlikely, at present, to change the status quo, as the CJEU is 
already quite willing to uphold claims against national measures where they impact the internal 
market, with a vast array of national measures being declared incompatible with the economic 
Treaty provisions, which, as documented, have been interpreted broadly. As Groussot et al. suggest, 
it appears unlikely that applicants will be able to rely on Article 16 where a stronger Treaty 
provision, such as one of the four freedoms, can be invoked, lest the latter provisions become 
“obsolete”.155 This has been similarly observed by Oliver, who recognised the irony in the four 
freedoms being a potential “surrogate” 156 for Article 16. 
One advantage Article 16 has over the four freedoms and other similar economic Treaty provisions 
however, is that, as ensured by Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51 TFEU, it applies directly to the 
“institutions and bodies of the Union”, as opposed to just Member States and/or private individuals. 
Indeed, under Article 52(1), any limitation by a Union institution on the rights and freedoms 
contained within the EUCFR “must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms”  in accordance with the principle of proportionality.  Article 16 is thus, in theory at 
30
152 European Commission Factsheet on the Right to be Forgotten (n 143), p3. 
153 See generally Groussot et al. (n 86). 
154 Indeed, it is important to stress that, by virtue of Article 51(1), the EUCFR applies only where EU law is engaged or 
where Member States “implement” EU law. Whilst a full consideration of this point is beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
is necessary to note that the CJEU has taken a broad approach to “implementation”, with Åkerberg generally confirming 
that the EUCFR will apply whenever Member States are acting within the scope of EU law. Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v 
Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
155 Groussot et al. (n 86) 9.
156 Oliver (n 88) 298.
least, better placed to challenge Union legislation which itself fails to respect the freedom to 
conduct a business or engage in economic activity, rather than just a Member State’s interpretation 
or implementation of it.
The CJEU’s interpretation of Article 52(1) will ultimately confirm whether this advantage can 
actually be realised in practice, and a recent attempt to use Articles 15 and 16 to more directly 
challenge EU law illustrates that this will not be an easy task. In the Deutsches Weintor157 case, 
Deutsches Weintor sought permission from the German Federal Administrative Court to use the 
description ‘easily digestible’, arguing that it did not breach Regulation 1924/2006 prohibiting 
health claims as its description referred only to general well-being, not health. The Court then 
referred to the ECJ, also asking whether the prohibition was consistent with the fundamental 
freedoms recognised by Articles 15 and 16. Unsurprisingly, the Court easily found that the 
description was a health claim, and that the prohibition contained in the Regulation, even though it 
was without exception, was compatible with the EUCFR as it fairly balances the protection of 
health (Article 35) with the company’s rights under Articles 15 and 16. 
It is certainly not contended that the CJEU interpret Article 52(1) so as to allow for the invalidation 
of a host of EU measures which may conflict with fundamental rights, as such an outcome would be 
absurd. However, in the unlikely, though not impossible, event that EU secondary legislation does 
seriously fail to adequately balance the rights of those affected, it should remain a possibility for the 
Courts to use Article 16 and other related rights and freedoms to aid a finding of illegality. This 
possibility will perhaps be tested in the upcoming Totally Wicked158 case, concerning the legality of 
the EU Tobacco Products Directive.159 Totally Wicked initiated judicial review proceedings in the 
UK, arguing in its Statement of Facts160 that it would be unlawful to implement the Directive as 
certain provisions within it relating to e-cigarettes (Article 20) were contrary to EU law and the 
internal market provisions, as e-cigarettes are not (as supported by scientific research) equivalent to 
tobacco or medicinal products as the Directive incorrectly assumes. Totally Wicked therefore 
asserts that the Directive fails to respect the principles of proportionality, equality (non-
discrimination), and subsidiarity, as well as the fundamental right to property and freedom to 
conduct a business. The High Court has subsequently referred to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. 
This case presents a stronger argument than the one found in Deutsches Weintor, with Bates 
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remarking that the case “should succeed” 161 on the grounds outlined above. He adds that whilst not 
submitted by Totally Wicked, there are also potential procedural violations to consider, such as the 
Commission’s failure to consult under Article 11(3) TEU. It is also worth noting that the same 
Directive is being challenged by other parties, including the Government of Poland. It remains to be 
seen how the Court will consider Article 16 in this case, and it is possible that it will either adopt a 
broad approach to the specifics of the Directive, or strike out the potentially malign Article 20 
without referring at all to Article 16 or the EUCFR, relying instead on the stronger principles of 
proportionality and/or equality. The case could however, confirm or deny the status of Article 16 
(albeit in conjunction with other rights) as a viable weapon with which to challenge Union 
legislation. 
2.5 How Much Freedom?
The freedom to conduct a business is subject to the limitations found within Article 16 itself, the 
general Article 52(1) and pre-charter “social function” limitations which apply to all fundamental 
rights and freedoms, and the CJEU’s own propensity. As submitted and discussed, the freedom to 
conduct a business ought to protect an individual’s ability to engage in economic initiative or 
activity without undue interference, with undue interference being determined in accordance with 
the limitations outlined above. While the nature and scope of the limitations are, as explored, far 
from clear, it is undisputed that Article 16 does not represent an absolute right or unbridled freedom 
to pursue commercial interests. Nor should it be used to politicise the CJEU or overcome distinctly 
political issues affecting economic interests such as Rosneft’s recent attempts162 to indirectly 
challenge sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia, which it asserts are indirectly and illegally 
affecting it. Although it is unclear whether Article 16, or indeed the EUCFR, would even apply in 
such a situation, it would be highly unlikely such a case would succeed, and Article 54 prohibits the 
use of any Charter rights “to engage in activity... aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in this Charter”. In any case, this is patently not the type of economic interest 
Article 16 is intended to protect. 
2.6 What Next?
The above analysis of Article 16 demonstrates that the CJEU is not sufficiently protecting or 
utilising the fundamental freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic initiative/activity. 
Indeed, the CJEU has been inconsistent in its reference to the freedom, acknowledging it in Scarlet 
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Extended, Sky Österreich and Mark Alemo-Herron, but ignoring it in the more recent Google Spain 
case. Furthermore, it is still the case that most attempts by companies to rely on Article 16 fail, 
possibly due to its association with the right to property. As stressed, it is not the failure itself of 
Article 16 claims that signifies the CJEU is failing to adequately protect the freedom to conduct a 
business, but rather the negligent or erratic way it balances the freedom with competing interests, 
often unjustifiably bundling it with other rights and hastily dismissing it as in Hauer and 
McDonagh. Bizarrely, it has also upheld it at the expense of a proper consideration of other 
fundamental rights too, such as employee rights in Mark Alemo-Herron, which Groussot et al. cite 
as a “serious” 163 failure on the part of the CJEU to consider the respective social functions of the 
competing fundamental rights.
Cases like Scarlet Extended and Sky Österreich, whilst opposing each other in outcome, verify that 
the CJEU can undertake a more detailed proportionality assessment, and moving forward, it is 
essential that the CJEU adopt this approach as a default stance, especially as it seems inevitable that 
more conflicts will arise between the rights and freedoms contained within the EUCFR. The Google 
Spain case unfortunately suggests that this is unlikely to happen anytime soon, with the Court 
adding, rather than clarifying, issues which it will undoubtedly have to resolve in the near future. 
More worrying is that the CJEU’s protection of the freedom seems reliant on the other interests or 
measures being considered, creating a dual reading of the freedom. Though it is important for the 
CJEU to cooperate with the other Union institutions in achieving EU aims, this cooperation should 
manifest itself at the balancing stage, with any weighting in favour of Union interests or legislation 
being explained in a more transparent and justified way. At present, the CJEU seems too ready to 
dismiss or overlook claims which challenge Union legislation or conflict with Union interests, an 
issue which goes beyond just Article 16 and has understandably given rise to some criticism. 
Indeed, as Leczykiewicz stresses, this “absence of discursive engagement”  with constitutional 
provisions such as the fundamental rights under discussion (and indeed, fundamental rights in 
general) undermines “constitutional justice”  within the EU, and fails to impose the required 
“justificatory requirements”on the law-making institutions, meaning that measures are too easily 
accepted as being justified, an outcome which threatens individual rights, questions the legitimacy 
of EU acts, and “undoubtedly impoverishes”  EU law.164 Such engagement with fundamental rights 
and their compatibility with each other and EU legislation is even more important when 
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considering, as Micklitz does,165  the very different expectations Member States and individuals 
have in respect of how these rights should be upheld and what degree of interference by law-
making institutions is justified and proportionate. The CJEU must therefore be more prepared to 
fully examine the nature of the rights and freedoms under discussion and why they outrank each 
other or are outranked by EU legislation on a case-by-case basis. At present, it is not clear that the 
CJEU is prepared to accept this task, but it is submitted that it must in order to achieve 
“constitutional justice”  and adequately protect the rights of individuals. The upcoming Totally 
Wicked case may nonetheless, provide an opportunity for the CJEU to improve on this stance, and 
clarify the role of Article 16 in challenging Union legislation which fails to adequately consider the 
freedom of “individuals” to engage in economic initiative or activity. 
3. Repeat Offenders: The Commission and Corporate Actors
As noted in the Introduction, corporate actors are amongst the most active litigants before the 
European Courts, often challenging national measures which conflict with EU law. They are also 
quite adept at challenging Commission “acts”  addressed to them (mostly decisions), and indeed, 
along with Member States, are the most common applicants in Judicial Review proceedings 
(particularly before the GC).166 Due to the more direct consequences of its actions (as opposed to 
the Council or other Union bodies), and the almost “insurmountable barriers”  that Article 263 
presents,167 the Commission is understandably the “most popular defendant”  in such proceedings.168 
It is therefore perhaps no surprise that corporate actors and the Commission have been labelled the 
“repeat players”  of the EU legal system, which Granger defines as players with the “financial, 
policy, and institutional capacity of engaging in long-term litigation”.169  Within the field of 
competition law, such repeat playing is all but guaranteed, as it primarily aims to regulate the 
actions of large corporate actors (or “undertakings”) who have the ability to affect competition 
within the EU. 
The problem here however, is that much like its approach vis-a-vis Union legislation, the CJEU 
often takes a more deferential approach to the Commission, with Granger noting the Commission’s 
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legal service has a “particularly strong influence”  on the CJEU, and that “according to all 
quantitative surveys, the court follows the Commission in the majority of cases”.170 This reality has 
also been confirmed by Hofmann, who states that, despite the “sparse”  judicial data, “every 
study” 171 he has reviewed indicates that in addition to being the most popular defendant, the 
Commission is also the “most successful litigant”,172  winning the majority of its cases. Such 
comments refer to both its standing as against Member States and as against other parties, including 
for the purposes of this discussion, corporate actors. 
Whilst statistics show that corporate actors have had some success in challenging Commission 
decisions in the competition field through Article 263,173  most of this success has been due to 
procedural faults, and if one takes the view that an “effective regime of judicial review acts as a 
counterbalance to the Commission’s broad powers”,174 such deference to the Commission can be 
problematic, especially in the field of competition law where the Commission essentially acts as 
investigator, prosecutor, and decision-maker. It should be noted that this “deference”  consists of the 
discretion or “margin of appreciation”  awarded to the Commission in competition cases, which the 
Courts are, due to the separation of administrative and judicial powers, more hesitant to review 
(considered below). 
The success rate of the Commission, and potential “prosecutorial bias” 175  stemming from its central 
role as judge, jury, and executioner, has given rise to genuine concerns about whether the rights of 
individuals (here mostly corporate actors) are being respected, recalling von Bogdandy’s assertion 
that when it comes to interference with fundamental rights by Union institutions, the protection 
awarded is “low” and discretion “broad”.176 More recently, Schweitzer has added that the CJEU has 
essentially “failed to systematically integrate the fundamental rights dimension” 177  into its judicial 
review of competition law cases. This is regrettable as it is clear that competition law enforcement 
can interfere with the fundamental rights of corporate actors, including the ones already considered 
in this paper such as the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business or engage in 
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economic activity. In addition to these rights, their right to due process is also threatened by the 
Commission’s role, as due to the fact that competition law sanctions are generally viewed as being 
criminal in nature,178 they fall within the scope of Article 6(1) ECHR, which requires that everyone 
be “entitled to a fair and public hearing... by an independent and impartial tribunal”, a right now 
also ensured by Article 47 EUCFR. The question then, is whether the CJEU actually has sufficient 
jurisdiction to protect these rights, and if so, whether it using it. This question is all the more 
significant as only the CJEU can rule on whether or not the decision or act in question is contrary to 
EU law. Indeed, Member State courts do not have the competence to declare such acts invalid, and 
unlike under Article 267 TFEU, do not get the opportunity to execute the CJEU’s “ruling”  which 
they could, in theory,179 refuse to implement for violating fundamental freedoms. 
3.1 ‘Full Jurisdiction’: Articles 261 and 263 TFEU
The main “weapons”  available for challenging or reviewing Commission decisions or penalties are 
Articles 261 and 263 TFEU, with the former granting “unlimited jurisdiction”  to “cancel, reduce or 
increase” 180 penalties issued by the Commission, and the latter allowing for a more general review 
or “control of legality”. This distinction between “unlimited jurisdiction”  and “control of legality” 
is, as Laguna de Paz comments, somewhat “confusing”  and should not be read to suggest that 
Article 263 provides for “limited jurisdiction”.181 Nonetheless, between the two Articles the CJEU 
has, at least textually, the scope to review decisions and fines issued by the Commission to 
corporate actors. In reality, its ability to review decisions is not unlimited, and the CJEU tends to 
confine itself, particularly in regards to Article 263, to a review of whether the decision in question 
is voided182 by a “manifest error”  in judgment by the Commission, which could take the form of, 
amongst other things: a failure to follow procedure; a failure to consider all relevant facts or a 
misinterpretation of them; a failure to demonstrate the harm being punished or to provide 
comprehensive reasoning and evidence; or the misuse of its powers.183 Similarly, the “unlimited 
jurisdiction”  provided for under Article 261 has “rarely”  been exercised,184and, as explored in 
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Siemens Österreich,185 is limited to an assessment of arguments the parties themselves raise, and the 
actual powers of the Commission (i.e. the CJEU cannot provide for fines or a re-allocation of them 
in a way that the Commission itself could not).
The limitations to its “control of legality” under Article 263 largely stem from the discretion or 
“margin of appreciation”  awarded to the Commission in regards to complex economic, technical or 
policy assessments. Such discretion is necessary to ensure that the judicial and administrative 
powers of the EU are properly separated and that the CJEU’s role is limited to the review of 
decisions and not the replacement or substitution of them. Indeed, the CJEU is not the “decision-
maker”  and “cannot perform new investigations”.186  A similar separation of powers and judicial 
deference to the executive can be found in some form in nearly every Member State, and whilst the 
“exact meaning, scope and rationale... have remained vague”,187  such deference is required for the 
successful functioning of a multifaceted politico-legal system.
This deference however, when coupled with the Commission’s broad investigative, prosecutorial, 
and enforcement powers, has been challenged by corporate actors asserting that their due process 
rights, as enshrined by Article 6(1) ECHR, have been infringed. With the upgrading of the EUCFR 
to primary law, many hoped to take advantage of the due process guarantees found in Chapter VI 
(Justice) to more effectively challenge the Commission’s concentration of power in competition 
investigations. However, as Swanson et al. summarise, such hope may have been misplaced with 
many “largely disappointed” with its “limited utility”  in challenging the Commission’s extensive 
investigative powers.188  It is worth noting first that the Commission is not a “tribunal”  for the 
purposes of Article 6(1) ECHR, with AG Sharpston confirming189 that it is sufficient for Article 6(1) 
if Commission decisions can be reviewed by a Court having “full jurisdiction”.190 The complaints 
thus centre around this “full jurisdiction” of the CJEU (particularly the GC) in reviewing such 
decisions. 
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In Menarini, whilst not specifically looking at EU competition law, the ECHR generally confirmed 
Sharpston’s approach, holding that sanctions imposed by administrative authorities (here the Italian 
Competition Authority) are compatible with Article 6(1) if subject to control by a court having full 
jurisdiction, which requires an ability to decide on all aspects of law and facts.191 As noted above, 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction under Articles 261 and 263 is far from unlimited. In KME Germany 
however, the ECJ stressed that the CJEU does have full jurisdiction over such decisions, with 
Article 261 providing for “unlimited jurisdiction”  in regards to fines, which it can substitute, alter or 
quash, and Article 263, whilst allowing for a margin of appreciation in regards to “complex 
economic assessments”, not preventing the CJEU “from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation 
of information of an economic nature”.192  It further added that the Courts must not “use the 
Commission’s margin of discretion... as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth 
review of the law and the facts”,193   and that its role is not only to establish whether the evidence 
used is “factually accurate, reliable and consistent”  but also that it contains all of the necessary 
information needed to make and support such a complex assessment.194
The CJEU found similarly in Chalkor,195  and the more recent Schindler196 case echoes these 
sentiments. Whether such an impassioned statement will alleviate fears that the CJEU cannot 
effectively review Commission competition decisions is questionable as many still argue that the 
Courts only pay “lip-service”  to due process matters.197 The cases do however, suggest a break from 
previous case law as regards the Commission’s discretion, with the CJEU seeming more confident 
in its ability to review these complex assessments. It is also important to note that in most of the 
cases where an infringement of rights has been alleged, the facts indicate a clear or “naked”  cartel, 
and so as Swanson et al.198 note, it seems likely that the outcome would have been the same even if 
the Court had scrutinised the entire economic assessment of the Commission. As concerns the 
CJEU’s “full jurisdiction”, it seems the matter is closed for now, and it appears that the CJEU can 
effectively review such decisions, though that is not to say that it does actually review them to the 
standard suggested in KME Germany and Chalkor. 
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Whilst it is not possible to review every due process infringement levied against the CJEU and 
Commission by corporate actors and other individuals, another worth briefly noting is the double 
jeopardy implications199 of the Commission’s central role and the fact that when the Commission 
undertakes an investigation, Member State courts are bound to accept its decision. This essentially 
means that, as in Otis,200  where the Commission exercises its fundamental right to seek 
compensation before a Member State court for competition law infringements affecting the EU, 
Member State courts must determine the compensation with the “harmful event”  (a necessary 
component of such compensation assessments) already being pre-determined by the Commission’s 
own decision and finding of fault. In Otis though, the CJEU held that this is not a breach of due 
process requirements as the decision itself can be challenged under Article 263, and the 
Commission has a legitimate right (along with anyone else harmed by such actions) to seek 
compensation on behalf of the EU. This is not the most convincing argument, and the fact that the 
CJEU has seemingly adopted a different approach to the ECHR in regards to double jeopardy (now 
found in Article 50 EUCFR)201 may create further problems in the future.  
Finally, as concerns these due process complaints, one should be aware that under Article 6(2) TEU 
the EU is bound to formally join the ECHR, which may grant a right of appeal to Article 263 cases 
and thus provide the ECtHR with a chance to more explicitly consider the EU’s current due process 
standards. The ECJ’s recent and surprising determination202 that the draft accession agreement is 
not compatible with EU law however, makes “accession very difficult, if not impossible”,203  with 
Peers commenting that the Court’s Opinion is a “clear and present danger to human rights 
protection”,204 and Douglas-Scott similarly criticising the Court’s seemingly protectionist stance on 
its own sovereignty.205 
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3.2 EU Competition Law and Protection of the Fundamental Freedom to Conduct a Business 
and Engage in Economic Activity  
Assuming the CJEU does actually have the “full jurisdiction”  it claims for itself in KME Germany, 
Chalkor, and Schindler, the question becomes whether it is sufficiently recognising and protecting 
the rights of corporate actors when reviewing fines or “controlling” the legality of decisions. 
Thus far, the CJEU has not explicitly referred to Article 16 or the other associated rights in 
competition law proceedings, and so it is difficult to consider the case law comprehensively. 
Furthermore, in proceedings under the competition law Treaty articles, the situation is rather 
different to the one considered in Section 2 as there is already an element of fault on behalf of the 
corporate actors. Indeed, where they have breached provisions such as Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, it 
will often be the case that they themselves have infringed EUCFR freedoms, including Article 16, 
which, as specified in the EUCFR explanations, includes the “right to free competition”.206 Usai’s 
assertion that Article 16 and EU competition law often serve the same purpose, thus seems apposite, 
as does his claim that there “would be no real right to economic initiative without competition 
law”.207 Certainly, the freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic activity would be 
rendered fantastical if there were no effective tools in place to regulate competition within the 
market. The situation must therefore be approached differently, as it entails a balancing of the same 
rights, and as noted, Article 54 EUCFR prevents rights and freedoms stemming from the EUCFR 
being used to violate other freedoms contained within it.
It is worth noting that in general the Commission undertakes relatively few investigations, with 
most ending before a Statement of Objections is issued or a decision made. Due to the average 
length of such investigations and the research required, where the Commission does proceed to 
issue a decision, it will often have a strong case against the accused undertakings. As such, and as 
mentioned, it is likely the undertakings will have breached EUCFR freedoms themselves, and so 
there will be little scope for them to invoke fundamental rights or freedoms beyond the due process 
ones considered above. The CJEU’s manifest error test may therefore be the most appropriate way 
to ensure the rights of corporate actors being “punished” are protected, and that the Commission’s 
finding is legitimate and supported by evidence that is accurate, consistent, and providing “sound 
factual basis”.208
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Whilst the Commission has discretion over “complex assessments”, the Courts have proved willing 
to challenge them where they appear unfounded, unconvincing, or fail to meet all of the required 
procedural checks, especially in the area of mergers where the Commission’s assessment is more 
speculative. Indeed, in Tetra Laval,209 the Court annulled the Commission’s determination that the 
proposed merger was anticompetitive as they had failed to adequately demonstrate the 
anticompetitive effects of the resulting concentration. Likewise in Hellenic Republic,210  the GC 
annulled the Commission’s Article 102 (and 106) decision because they had failed to prove that the 
undertaking had abused or had the potential to abuse its dominant position on the market; it had 
merely determined that the state measure in question created unequal opportunities, which the GC 
held, was insufficient to find an infringement. 
In regards to fines and its unlimited jurisdiction under Article 261, the CJEU has also been 
forthcoming in amending them where the Commission fails to account for certain facts, with 
Cassels finding that only around 50% of cartel fines are upheld entirely.211 As such, in Chalkor, the 
Court reduced the base amount as the Commission failed to account for the fact that the undertaking 
had only participated in one branch of the complex cartel, and in BASF,212  they conducted a re-
calculation and substantially reduced the imposed fines to better reflect the true roles of the 
cartelists. Laguna de Paz’s assertion that discretion does not mean a “lower standard of proof”  thus 
seems accurate,213 and as the Commission’s fines have increased over the years, Craig’s conclusion 
that the CJEU’s “review of both fact and discretion has become more intensive over time”  seems 
encouraging.214 Indeed, whilst these complex assessments are subject to a more limited review, it is 
the CJEU that has ultimately determined the requirements the Commission must meet when making 
a decision or fining the undertakings involved, and it has not refrained from invalidating or at least 
modifying them where they fail to meet the requisite standards. 
As established, it is clear that Article 16 does not provide a right to unrestrained economic pursuit, 
and whilst competition penalties can affect a company’s freedom to conduct a business or engage in 
economic initiative, where a Commission decision is substantiated and supported by the required 
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evidence, it is arguable that the Commission itself is contributing to the protection of the freedom 
by fostering a more competitive market within which the freedom to conduct a business and “right 
to free competition”  can be exercised. Usai’s conclusion215  that Article 16 is not limited by 
competition law is thus, in this respect, well founded. 
4. Going Beyond Fines: Microsoft and Google - Punished for 
Being Too Good?
One situation where the freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic activity is perhaps 
threatened by competition law is where the Commission orders remedies that go beyond just fines 
or the cessation of the infringement, and encroach more directly on the actual operations of the 
undertaking or its property. 
The Commission’s broad discretion as to the policy it adopts and the cases it chooses to investigate 
has often been criticised for being protectionist with many high profile investigations being directed 
at large American corporations, and though constitutionally it is not for the Courts to adjudicate on 
such policy decisions, the CJEU must be aware of the implications for undertakings living a “life 
under the regulators’ gaze”.216 As Economides and Lianos recognise,217  it is true that competition 
remedies must aim to achieve both “micro”  and “macro”  goals, the former being the cessation of 
the infringement and compensating of victims, and the latter being the restoration of the market to 
“but for”  conditions and implementation of measures to prevent recurrence. Indeed, such “macro” 
goals are essential for the maintenance of any semblance of free competition, which as discussed, is 
part and parcel of Article 16 and the freedom to conduct a business or engage in economic activity. 
Merely fining infringing undertakings would do little to restore the market as many have the 
financial capacity to withstand significant fines, especially if the underlying infringement proves 
more profitable in the long run (Kaldor-Hicks efficient). As such, “conduct remedies”  like the 
required untying of Windows Media Player and the Windows operating system in Microsoft,218  are 
effective ways to somewhat restore the market and/or remove the anticompetitive restraint. 
However, more intrusive remedies which interfere with the undertaking’s actual business plans, 
property rights, or commercial strategies, present a slightly different issue, as whilst they might aid 
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restoration of the market, they can also erode an undertaking’s autonomy or freedom to conduct a 
business, which can consequently harm consumers. Although it has been noted that corporate actors 
breaching competition law will often have infringed others’ EUCFR freedoms, and so may have 
little scope to invoke the EUCFR when challenging the decision (if well founded), this should not 
mean that their own rights and freedoms should be overlooked at the remedy stage, as the situation 
is quite distinct from the initial determination of liability. Indeed, though they may have a hard time 
arguing their rights are more worthy of protection on proportionality grounds at the decision stage, 
there should be no such limitation when considering the remedies, as they alone shoulder the brunt 
of the penalties. 
Thus, the remedies required from the infringing undertakings should, like all other Union 
measures,219 be proportionate. In many cases it seems likely that the remedy will be proportionate 
(regardless of whether the CJEU explicitly refers to Article 16 or the associated rights), as the 
infringement itself will often indicate the most suitable remedy, as was arguably the case with the 
untying of WMP and Windows OS. However, where undertakings are required to disclose 
knowledge or supply confidential information to competitors so that they can compete better, the 
CJEU must recognise the potential threat to the corporate actor/undertaking’s right to property and 
freedom to conduct a business. The requirement in the same case that Microsoft supply competitors 
with information about its operating systems so that they could develop secondary competing 
products is thus worthy of more scrutiny than the requirement it untie its products. 
Indeed, in such cases there is a legitimate argument that companies are being punished for being 
“too good”, and as one author notes in response to the Commission’s charges of abuse against 
Google, whilst the Commission must be observant, “it would be wrong for Google to be hamstrung 
by regulators merely because its services are superior to those offered by rivals”.220  Such a 
statement bears a strong resemblance to academic debates about whether competition law aims to 
protect competitors or competition itself, and this is a balance that the CJEU must ensure the 
Commission strikes. As many advocate,221 competition law should aim to protect only consumers 
and the structure of the market itself, not competitors. In new economies, this aim is particularly 
vexed as companies can acquire and lose vast market shares quickly depending on their ability to 
innovate and adapt. As such, it is difficult to consider the counterfactual situation, where it will 
often be the case that without the “infringing”  company there would be no product market within 
which others could even compete. The Commission must therefore consider, as must the CJEU 
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where challenged, the implications of any remedy that requires the disclosure of information which 
may be key to the undertaking’s business strategy, as it could prove to be an “intolerable” 
interference with their rights and freedoms, most obviously Articles 16 and 17 EUCFR. Indeed, the 
very advent of intellectual property protection was built on similar considerations, so as to allow 
society (and for the purposes of this discussion, consumers) to benefit from innovation by providing 
protection for innovators.
In Microsoft, Microsoft was found to have infringed EU (and US) competition law by refusing to 
provide competitors with necessary interoperability information to enable them to develop software 
which was compatible with Windows operating systems. Due to the ubiquity of Microsoft’s 
operating systems, this refusal, according to the Commission, effectively “eliminated competition in 
the relevant market”  as the “information was indispensable for competitors”.222  Microsoft was thus 
held to be causing harm to consumers by reducing the selection of products available to them, and 
by leveraging its dominance in the OS market to that of the secondary work group server one.223 A 
full consideration of the Microsoft decision is not possible, nor integral for this discussion, but the 
order that Microsoft “disclose complete and accurate specifications”224 in order to “ensure 
Microsoft’s competitors can develop products that interoperate with Windows domain architecture... 
and hence viably compete with Microsoft’s” 225 products on that market, is significant. 
Furthermore, as Economides and Lianos highlight,226 the Commission’s order applies prospectively, 
meaning that Microsoft must update the specifications when introducing new versions, and also 
implies that Microsoft’s ability to seek remuneration for this “licencing”  is limited so as to ensure 
“viable competition”. Unsurprisingly, such disclosure proved problematic, as due to the technical 
nature of the information, it was hard to decipher what information constituted “complete and 
accurate”  disclosure, and Microsoft subsequently faced a number of penalties. Whilst such an order 
seems to heavily interfere with Microsoft’s right to conduct a business or engage in economic 
activity by using its own innovation to profit and grow, it is important to note that this secondary 
market was already well-established as Microsoft had previously provided competitors with the 
required information for its earlier generations. The Commission therefore found that Microsoft’s 
sudden decision to provide less information was the “key factor” 227 for its “rapid rise to 
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dominance” 228 in the secondary market, and thus part of a deliberate leveraging strategy contrary to 
EU law. This clear history of providing similar information is important when considering the 
proportionality of the remedy, and though Microsoft’s rights to property and to conduct a business 
may have been limited, it is submitted that the order was proportionate in this instance, as the 
information disclosed was not essential or a key part of Microsoft’s business strategy or product 
offering, but was essential for the other actors on the market. 
The situation is different however when considering the recent anticompetitive charges brought 
against Google. Whilst it is too early to consider the full ramifications of the Commission’s 
investigation and charges, as they have largely been confined to Google’s relatively insignificant 
shopping services (including the failed ‘Froogle’), suggestions that further charges may follow 
merit attention.229 In particular, whilst the Statement of Objections separates the “general search” 
and “comparison shopping”  markets, in considering the latter, much discussion centred around 
Google’s “systematic favouring”  of its own services which has a “negative impact on consumers 
and innovation”230 and potentially distorts search results so that the most relevant ones for 
consumers are rendered less visible than Google’s own. These arguments are not entirely 
convincing, and it seems unlikely that anyone would limit their search to the first few options 
provided by Google, especially in the comparison shopping market where Google has a lower 
reputation and market share. Likewise, the Commission’s claims that innovation is compromised as 
competitors will be deterred because of this favouring of Google products seems dubious, and as 
Fumagalli notes, “Google is not a regulated entity which needs to grant access to competitors on 
equal terms” 231 and so merely claiming that google discriminates is not a particularly strong 
argument to justify interference with the way it uses its own product.232 
Indeed, in this regard the situation is disparate to the one considered in Microsoft above, as the 
search engine is Google’s primary product. More concerning then, are calls from some for Google 
to disclose its confidential algorithms so as to provide greater accountability and determine whether 
Google is using its search engine to hurt rivals.233 Whilst the Commission has not itself adopted this 
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approach yet, such a requirement would be a gross and disproportionate breach of Google’s right to 
property and freedom to conduct a business. For now, the Commission requires only that Google 
treat its own shopping service the same way as it treats its rivals,234  which it stresses does “not 
interfere with either the algorithms Google applies or how it designs its search pages”.235 This 
suggested remedy already seems to come with inherent flaws, and whilst the investigation is still 
ongoing, the case will certainly test whether the Commission is genuinely trying to protect 
consumers and competition itself, or Google’s competitors. The CJEU must therefore, treat any 
decision, which will likely be subject to appeal if not settled, with great caution to ensure it 
adequately protects Google’s EUCFR rights and freedoms. Indeed, the CJEU would be wise to 
explicitly refer to Articles 16 and 17 in assessing whether the Commission is protecting competition 
or protecting competitors in a potentially protectionist way. With new economies providing a 
myriad of new ways to amass market share and create markets, questions about the most prudent 
way to safeguard competition are only likely to become more complex, and the CJEU must be 
ready to ensure that the rights and freedoms of corporate actors and innovators are respected.
5. Conclusion
The preceding discussion has considered and analysed the extent to which the CJEU has used the 
weapons at its disposal (primarily Article 16 EUCFR and its ‘full jurisdiction’ under Articles 261 
and 263 TFEU) to protect the rights and freedoms of corporate actors within the EU. Whilst it may 
seem strange to discuss the fundamental rights of companies, as explored, the European Union was 
largely premised on economic integration and although there has been some development in regards 
to the protection of more typical fundamental rights, it still appears to be the case that the EU has 
not fully embraced “any substantive ideal of justice going beyond... the economic objectives of the 
market integration project”.236 As such, the general corporate use of the EUCFR and fundamental 
rights and freedoms to protect economic interests is, as Leczykiewicz suggests, largely “compatible 
with the market-orientated focus of the EU’s own activities”.237
As stated, Article 16 arguably represents the most explicit formulation of a company’s interest, and 
marks the first time the freedom to conduct a business has been codified in a binding Union 
document. It was submitted, in line with AG Cruz Villalón’s interpretation in Mark Alemo-Herron, 
that the right ought to be read so as to ensure that individuals can engage in economic activity 
without undue or “intolerable”  interference. Thus far, the CJEU has not provided a definitive 
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definition of what the freedom actually entails, but has in a variety of cases adopted a similar 
interpretation of the freedom, holding, in line with what is now Article 52(1) EUCFR, that the 
freedom must be upheld and that limitations must “respect the essence” of the freedom. 
Unfortunately, and despite its codification, the CJEU has greatly underused Article 16, with 
reference to it being irregular at best, and the weight afforded to it varying significantly depending 
on which measures, rights, and freedoms it is being used to counter. Although the Courts have 
proved willing to use it (in combination with other rights and freedoms or legislation) against 
private individuals and Member States, it appears that its role as a “sword”  with which to challenge 
EU legislation will be limited. Furthermore, despite the textual disentangling of the freedom from 
the associated right to property, the CJEU has continued to bundle the freedom with it, giving 
Article 16 little scope to act in its own right and leaving it vulnerable to the CJEU’s irreverence of 
the latter right. 
As stressed throughout this paper, it is not the failure of the Courts to uphold the freedom which 
demonstrates that the CJEU’s protection is inadequate, but rather the inconsistent or non-existent 
proportionality assessments it undertakes to determine whether the freedom is being unduly 
interfered with. Though Scarlet Extended and Sky Österreich show a more activist approach to 
assessing the proportionality of interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms, the recent 
Google Spain case reaffirms the historically diffident approach to the freedom to conduct a 
business, and to fundamental rights in general, re-enforcing longstanding concerns that the price to 
pay for the achievement of EU policy goals and integration is substandard rights protection.238 
As regards Articles 261 and 263, despite convincingly claiming “full jurisdiction”  to review the law 
and facts of Commission decisions in the field of competition law, it is not clear the CJEU is 
actually using it to the standard it assures it can in KME Germany. Indeed, the CJEU often defers to 
the Commission, and too easily classifies things as a complex assessment which it must review 
more hesitantly, to the effect that, as Leczykiewicz asserts, it restricts its own powers of review and 
undermines its ability to promote constitutional justice.239 Furthermore, as Douglas-Scott warns,240 
the EU is perfectly capable of committing injustice, and the CJEU must therefore be ready to rectify 
it, lest it contribute to the injustice itself. As submitted, it appears that the CJEU’s review of fines 
and decisions is generally adequate, and it has on numerous occasions been willing to alter (though 
not quash) Commission fines, and question Commission decisions which fail to meet the required 
47
238 Micklitz (n 165) 18.
239 Leczykiewicz (n 62) 107.
240 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘Justice, Injustice and the Rule of Law in the EU’ (2015) in Kochenov et al (n 62) Europe’s 
Justice Deficit?. 
standards. There are however legitimate due process concerns which have not been persuasively 
allayed by the CJEU, and are further jeopardised by the ECJ’s recent determination that EU 
accession to the ECHR is not practicable at present. It also remains to be seen whether the CJEU is 
willing to protect the rights of corporate actors against competition remedies which impinge upon 
their economic strategies or property rights, a question that will only become more pressing as new 
economies continue to develop in both scope and complexity. 
Overall, it would appear that the CJEU lacks the ammunition or desire to use the weapons available 
to it, and outside of the four freedoms where its protection is strong, is not adequately protecting the 
rights of corporate actors. Whilst it has offered some protection through Article 16 EUCFR and 
Articles 261 and 263 TFEU, this protection has been haphazard and heavily influenced by the 
CJEU’s own Union bias. Indeed, it is this last point which ultimately impedes the CJEU’s ability to 
use the weapons it has to protect corporate actors. As contended, the CJEU adopts a three-fold 
approach to the protection of fundamental rights, with its review being aggressive as against 
Member States infringing the four freedoms, ambivalent in the balancing of conflicting and 
sensitive non-union measures, and uncompromising in attempts to challenge Union acts and 
measures. There thus remains, despite Article 16’s potential, no viable way of either indirectly 
(through Article 267 TFEU) or directly (through Article 263 TFEU) challenging EU legislative acts 
which fail to respect the rights of corporate actors, and this is regrettable. More problematic is that 
the CJEU rarely undertakes a full proportionality assessment explaining why certain fundamental 
rights outrank each other or why EU measures constitute a justified restriction on an individual’s 
rights and freedoms. This consequently subverts some of the EU’s legitimacy, as it diminishes the 
justificatory value of the rights, freedoms, or legislative acts in question.
The CJEU must therefore be more consistent in its approach and legitimately balance the competing 
interests of private parties, Member States, and Union institutions on a case-by-case basis, so as to 
ensure that it does not itself contribute to the proposed “justice deficit” 241 within the EU and 
infringe its own institutional responsibility to observe and respect the rights and freedoms of 
individuals (whether corporate or not). 
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